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CORPORATIONS-UNDER DELAWARE LAW, MAJORITY SHAREHOLDERS
HAVE No DUTY TO ENSURE THAT MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS BENEFIT
FROM A CONTRACTUAL CORPORATE DIVIDEND DISTRIBUTION POLICY
WHERE THE LATTER'S CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES PRECLUDE
ENJOYMENT OF THE BENEFIT
In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509 (1983)
The Reading Company (Reading), owner of an interstate railroad, en-
tered into bankruptcy reorganization in 1971.1 In April 1976, Reading dis-
continued its rail operations and conveyed its rail properties to the
Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), pursuant to the Regional Rail Re-
organization Act of 1973.2
One of Reading's assets subject to the control of the trustee in reorgani-
zation was a block of Trailer Train Corporation (Trailer Train) stock. 3
Trailer Train was formed in 1955 for the sole purpose of facilitating inter-
railroad "piggyback" shipments by establishing a pool of standardized rail-
road flat cars4 to be leased at minimum rates to shareholders. 5 Since its
1. In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 512 (3d Cir. 1983). Reading's reorganization
proceedings were commenced under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Id See Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealedby Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. All subsequent proceedings, including this
appeal, were governed by the 1898 Act. 711 F.2d at 512 n.1 (citing Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 403(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2683).
2. 711 F.2d at 512 (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 701-797m (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The
Regional Rail Reorganization Act was passed in response to the failure of several
major northeastern carriers. See Perritt, Ask and Ye Shall Receive." The Legislative Re-
sponse to the Northeast Rail Crisis, 28 VILL. L. REV. 271, 297-301 (1983). The Act pro-
vided that the bankrupt railroads would convey their rail holdings to Conrail, a
federally funded corporation, which would operate rail service on the transferred
properties. Id. at 300.
Reading emerged from bankruptcy reorganization in 1981 but has not reentered
the railroad business. 711 F.2d at 512.
3. 711 F.2d at 512-13. Reading acquired 500 shares of Trailer Train stock in
1961, at a book value of $150,105. d. at 513 (footnote omitted). In so doing, Read-
ing purchased the minimum number of shares which would enable it to lease stan-
dardized railroad flat cars under Trailer Train's shareholder pooling agreement. Id.
For a discussion of Trailer Train's pooling arrangement, see notes 4-5 tnfra.
4. In re Reading Co., 551 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 711 F.2d
509 (3d Cir. 1983). In 1955, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company and others formed
Trailer Train and established a pool of 500 standardized railroad cars for hire by
shareholder railroads. 711 F.2d at 512. By 1979, Trailer Train's pool had grown to
87,494 piggyback (intermodal), autorack, and special use cars. Id. This represented
approximately 90% of all of such cars in use in the United States. Id. (citation
omitted).
5. 711 F.2d at 513. Trailer Train leases cars to railroads across the country
under a shareholder pooling agreement which has been approved by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Id. (citing American Rail Box Car Co.-Pooling, 347 I.C.C.
862 (1974)). To participate in the plan, a railroad must purchase 500 shares of
(932)
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incorporation, Trailer Train's policy has been to lease cars to shareholder
railroads at the lowest rates necessary to cover expenses, and to invest accu-
mulated earnings in new equipment. 6 Trailer Train does not attempt to
maximize profits and has never paid a dividend to its shareholders. 7 The
only benefits of stock ownership are access to the large pool of standardized
cars and Trailer Train's car hire rates.8 When Reading purchased its stock
Trailer Train stock and sign the "Form A Car Contract," which sets forth Trailer
Train's rate policy. Railroads owning at least 500 shares have access to Trailer Train
cars at Trailer Train's hire rates for use on their own lines or to interchange with
other shareholder or nonshareholder railroads. 711 F.2d at 513. For a discussion of
Trailer Train's policy as set forth in the Form A Contract, see notes 6 & 9 and accom-
panying text uhfra.
Reading's 500 shares constituted 2.44% of the outstanding capital stock of
Trailer Train. 551 F. Supp. at 1207. The remaining stock is owned by 30 operating
railroads, the trustees of Erie Lackawanna Railway Co. (a railroad which entered
bankruptcy reorganization prior to Reading), and a diversified freight forwarding
company. Id. Each shareholder is entitled to nominate one director for each block of
500 shares held; the nominees are elected to the board by all shareholders. Id. The
district court found that nearly all members of Trailer Train's board of directors are
officers of the constituent shareholder railroads. Id.
6. 551 F. Supp. at 1210. Trailer Train's rate policy is set forth in Supplement
No. 40 of the Form A Car Contract between Trailer Train and its shareholders.
It shall be the policy of Trailer Train to maintain per diem, mileage
and other charges at the lowest level required to meet Trailer Train's ordi-
nary and necessary costs and expenses, . . . and to accumulate retained
earnings adequate to support continued reasonable enlargement of the
number of cars in the pool, to that number found to be needed. It is the
intention [of Trailer Train and each of its shareholders] that the total com-
pensation paid to Trailer Train. . . shall be no greater than consistent with
the foregoing policy.
Id. (quoting Stipulation of Fact No. 34). The finance committee of the board of
directors of Trailer Train is responsible for setting up and reviewing the rates to be
charged for car hire and for other financial matters. Id. As of December 1979, the
district court found that of the ten largest users of Trailer Train flatcars, who ac-
counted for 80% of the total use of this equipment, nine had director representatives
on the financial committee. Id.
7. 711 F.2d at 513.
8. 551 F. Supp. at 1210-11. The district court found that
the benefits of Trailer stock ownership are
(a) For most car types and for most users, rates below ICC rates for the
same or similar equipment;
(b) Access to cars without long-term financial obligation;
(c) Access to a free-running pool of intermodal cars;
(d) A pricing policy that encourages broad use of cars;
(e) Standardization of cars, pooling of information concerning car needs,
and efficient volume purchases;
(0 Equipment obligations carried as debts of Trailer Train and not of the
railroad shareholders.
Id. From 1956 to 1969, Trailer Train shareholders paid slightly higher rates for the
use of Trailer Train cars than they would have paid under the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) per diem rate schedule had they chosen to use their own cars on
other railroads' lines. Id. Due to a change in the ICC per diem rate formula in 1969,
the aggregate car hire rates paid by most Trailer Train shareholders since then have
been lower than the ICC rates. Id. Projections of growth, revenues, and net income
1983-84]
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in 1961, it signed a contract setting forth Trailer Train's car rate policy.9
For fifteen years Reading used Trailer Train's flat cars in its rail operations
without challenging the rate policy.' 0
After transferring its rail properties to Conrail in 1976, Reading no
longer derived any benefit from its ownership of Trailer Train stock." I Fur-
ther, Reading's trustees were unable to sell the stock to an operating rail-
road.1 2 At that point, Reading's trustees suggested that Trailer Train
change its dividend policy, repurchase the stock at book value, or exchange
the stock for newly-created debt instruments reflecting Reading's propor-
tionate ownership. ' 3
When the board of directors of Trailer Train would not agree to any
changes in its policy, Reading's trustees successfully petitioned the reorgani-
zation court to order Trailer Train to negotiate a settlement which would
prepared by management indicated that Trailer Train's rates would remain below
prevailing ICC rates through 1988. Id.
9. 711 F.2d at 513. Reading signed the Form A Car Contract when it
purchased its shares of Trailer Train stock. Id. The pertinent portion of the Form A
Contract appears in note 6 supra. Trailer Train also informed Reading at the time of
the purchase that "the car contract requires Trailer Train Company to set per diem
and other charges on a basis that will enable the company to meet its expenses and to
finance its car acquisitions without, however, yielding excessive profits to Trailer
Train Company." 711 F.2d at 513.
10. 711 F.2d at 513. In fact, while in reorganization, Reading joined with the
other shareholders to seek ICC approval of the pooling arrangement and Trailer
Train's financial policy, which was ultimately granted. Id. (citing American Rail
Box Car Co.-Pooling, 347 I.C.C. 862, 907-08 (1974)).
When Reading terminated its rail operations and transferred its rail properties
to Conrail, Reading's trustees successfully requested that its Trailer Train stock not
be transferred, "because in their view the stock 'was a valuable asset of the Reading
Estate which would eventually produce substantial value for. . . creditors and stock-
holders.'" Id. at 514 (quoting Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 271-72).
11. Id. at 513.
12. Id. Reading's trustees offered Reading's stock to Trailer Train for repur-
chase at book value, as required under the Form A Car Contract between Trailer
Train and its shareholders, but the corporation declined to repurchase the stock. Id.
at 514 & n.3 (citation omitted). Reading's trustees also investigated the possibility of
selling Reading's shares to the other Trailer Train stockholders, but they found no
market. 551 F. Supp. at 1211. The district court found that "because nearly all of
the major railroads in the country are already Trailer Train shareholders and be-
cause Trailer Train does not pay dividends, no benefit would accrue to an existing
shareholder from owning additional shares." Id.
13. 711 F.2d at 513. Reading was not the first to suggest a change in Trailer
Train's dividend/rate policy. See 557 F. Supp. at 1211. Trailer Train's shareholders
own from 500 to 1500 shares each, although all shareholders of at least 500 shares
enjoy the same right of access to equipment. Id. The district court found that there
were wide variations between the shareholders' percentage stock ownership and their
proportionate use of equipment, and that the ownership/use discrepancy had been
the subject of discussions since 1970. Id. In 1975-76 the board of Trailer Train ap-
pointed a shareholder committee to consider the ownership/use matter in view of the
pending transfer of Penn Central, Reading, and Erie Lackawanna rail properties to
Conrail. Id. In 1978 the finance committee considered restructuring the capital stock
to deal with the ownership/user matter. Id. However, none of these committees rec-
ommended that Trailer Train change its policies. Id. at 1212.
[Vol. 28: p. 932
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enable Reading to derive some benefit from its Trailer Train stock.1 4 After a
year of unsuccessful negotiations under court order, Reading's trustees
amended their petition to request an order compelling Trailer Train either
to repurchase the stock or to convert it into interest-bearing debt instruments
or dividend-paying preferred stock. 15 In a second amended petition, the
trustees contended that Trailer Train's policies constituted a breach of duty
to Reading as a minority shareholder. 16
The district court held that the majority shareholders of Trailer Train
had breached their fiduciary duty of fairness by failing to allow Reading to
obtain a benefit from its stock ownership comparable to that enjoyed by the
shareholders who use the corporation's equipment.1 7 The district court or-
dered Trailer Train to repurchase Reading's stock' 8 at current book value. ' 9
14. 711 F.2d at 514.
15. Id. The trustees' first petition, filed February 1, 1978, alleged that as a result
of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, Reading could no longer profit from its
membership in Trailer Train. Id. (citation omitted). The petitioners stated that until
this "problem" was resolved, they could not file a complete plan for reorganization.
Id.
Trailer Train moved to dismiss Reading's petition, contending that the reorgan-
ization court lacked summary jurisdiction over the issues raised, and that Reading's
claim had to be resolved in a plenary proceeding by a court of general jurisdiction.
Id. The reorganization court held that it had summary jurisdiction, and entered an
order compelling negotiations between Trailer Train and Reading. Id. (citation
omitted). After approximately one year of unsuccessful negotiations, Trailer Train
renewed its motion to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction, and again the
court denied the motion. Id. See In re Reading Co., 2 Bankr. 719 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
16. 711 F.2d at 514.
17. Id. at 514, 517-18. Reading contended that Trailer Train's "board of direc-
tors, acting at the behest of its majority shareholders, had breached a fiduciary duty
owed to Reading and other similarly-situated minority shareholders." Id. at 517.
Reading claimed the board breached that duty by reaffirming Trailer Train's car
leasing policy, refusing to pay dividends, and continuing to reinvest earnings in new
equipment despite Reading's departure from the railroad business. Id. These poli-
cies amounted to self-dealing on the part of the majority stockholders, Reading con-
tended, because the operating railroads continued to enjoy the use of the cars to
Reading's "exclusion and detriment." Id. at 518. Reading claimed that the low car
hire rates constituted a "constructive dividend" to the operating railroads, which was
denied to Reading and other non-user shareholders. Id. For a discussion of the fidu-
ciary duty owed a minority stockholder, see notes 25-35 and accompanying text thfra.
For a discussion of the need to demonstrate self-dealing in an action asserting breach
of fiduciary duty, see notes 38-43 and accompanying text tifra.
The petition requested that the court order Trailer Train to pay dividends on
the stock or to pay a share of the savings realized by pool users on account of Trailer
Train's low rates. 711 F.2d at 514. In the meantime, Trailer Train had hired outside
consultants to study the non-user shareholder issue. Id. at 514 n.4. These consultants
claimed that Trailer Train had consistently functioned like a co-operative and that
stock ownership was never intended to be for investment purposes. Id. Therefore,
they concluded that the sole benefit of stock ownership should continue to be the use
of the railroad cars. Id. Trailer Train then offered to purchase Reading's stock for
$1,500,000, but Reading's trustees refused. Id. Trailer Train informed the Third
Circuit that this offer would remain open regardless of the outcome of the litigation.
id.
18. 551 F. Supp. at 1214-18. The district judge stated:
1983-84]
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Trailer Train appealed, arguing that the district court lacked summary juris-
diction as a reorganization court to hear Reading's petition, and that neither
the directors nor the majority stockholders of Trailer Train had breached
any fiduciary duty owed to Reading as a minority shareholder.
20
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
2
'
upheld the district court's exercise of jurisdiction 22 but reversed the lower
While this case presents an unusual variation on the standard situation
where a dominant shareholder unilaterally dictates corporate policy for its
own benefit and to the detriment of the minority shareholders and possibly
the corporation, I am convinced that the combination of Reading's mini-
mal percentage ownership, its inability to derive any benefit from its invest-
ment under existing corporate policies, and the complete illiquidity of
Trailer Train's stock, brings this action within the ambit of those Delaware
cases which have imposed a fiduciary obligation of fairness upon majority
shareholders.
Id. at 1214. The district court found that the majority shareholders (users of Trailer
Train equipment) dominated the board of directors of Trailer Train. Id. at 1217.
For a discussion of the selection of Trailer Train directors, see note 5 supra. The court
also found that the majority exercised its control of corporate processes to retain the
policies under which equipment use was the sole benefit of stock ownership, thereby
benefitting themselves at the expense of nonuser shareholders. 551 F. Supp. at 1217-
18. The court stated that where the majority shareholders have control and domina-
tion of the corporation and engage in self-dealing, Delaware law subjects their ac-
tions to scrutiny under the test of intrinsic fairness. d. at 1215-17 (citations omitted).
For a discussion of the intrinsic fairness test and the fiduciary duty of majority share-
holders under Delaware law, see notes 34-43 and accompanying text znfra. The court
concluded that the majority shareholders of Trailer Train had breached their fiduci-
ary duty of fairness to the minority by failing to allow minority non-user shareholders
to participate pro rata in the returns of the enterprise. 551 F. Supp. at 1218 (citing
Southern Pac. Ry. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919)) (further citation omitted).
For a discussion of the fiduciary duties of majority shareholders, see notes 34-35 and
accompanying text infra.
19. 555 F. Supp. 1205. The parties stipulated that the current book value of the
stock was $9,830,707, and the court ordered Trailer Train to pay upon the tender of
the stock by Reading. 711 F.2d at 514.
20. 711 F.2d at 514-15.
21. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Hunter and Higginbotham, and
Judge John F. Gerry, United States District Judge for the District of New Jersey,
sitting by designation. Judge Hunter delivered the opinion of the court.
22. 711 F.2d at 514-17. The district court held that it had jurisdiction to hear
Reading's trustees' claim both as a reorganization court and as a federal court sitting
in diversity. Id at 515. The Third Circuit agreed with Trailer Train that the district
court, sitting as a reorganization court, did not have summary jurisdiction to enforce
the obligation which Reading's petition alleged was owed by Trailer Train. Id. at
516 (citing In re Roman, 23 F.2d 556, 558 (2d Cir. 1928) (interpreting Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 23(b), 30 Stat. 544, 552)). The Third Circuit noted that while
a reorganization court may have summary jurisdiction to determine title to a chose in
action, this jurisdiction does not allow a reorganization to enforce that chose in action
where the alleged obligation is subject to substantial dispute. 711 F.2d at 515-16. See
Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 471 n.7 (1974) (a chose in action may
be "property" of the debtor under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898); In re Lehigh Valley
R.R., 458 F.2d 1041, 1043-45 (3d Cir. 1972) (a reorganization court may treat the
performance of an executory obligation as property of the debtor only where the
obligor does not dispute the obligation or its amount); In re Penn Central Transp.
Co., 453 F.2d 520, 523 (3d Cir. 1972) (where a substantial dispute exists, the trustee
[Vol. 28: p. 932
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court on the merits, holding that under Delaware law,23 majority stockholders
have no duty to ensure that a minority shareholder benefit from its stock
investment when the latter's changed circumstances render it unable to de-
rive benefit from the corporate dividend distribution policy established by
contractual agreement. In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1983).
It is a basic principle of corporate law that the board of directors, vested
with the management of the corporation, is required to use its best judgment
and independent discretion in determining and executing corporate policy.24
Directors owe a fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing2 5 as well as a
must resort to a plenary action in a court of general jurisdiction to establish that the
obligation is an asset subject to the jurisdiction of the reorganization court), cert. de-
ntid, 408 U.S. 923 (1972). Because Trailer Train raised a substantial objection to its
alleged obligation to exchange Reading's stock for other property, the district court
did not have jurisdiction as a reorganization court to decide the matter. 711 F.2d at
516.
However, the Third Circuit noted that § 23(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
allowed district courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction over controversies between
trustees and adverse claimants over property claimed for the debtor's estate. Id. (cit-
ing Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 23(a), 30 Stat. 544, 552). The Third Circuit
found that the requisite elements of diversity jurisdiction were satisfied in that Read-
ing's principal place of business was Pennsylvania, Trailer Train was incorporated in
Delaware, and the amount in controversy was greater than $10,000. 711 F.2d at 516
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982)). The court rejected the argument that the district
court's assumption of summary reorganization jurisdiction deprived Trailer Train of
its right to a plenary mode of procedure because it found that the district court had
given both sides a full hearing and that " '[n]o essential characteristic of a plenary
proceeding was lacking.' " 711 F.2d at 517 (quoting Penn Central, 453 F.2d at 522)
(further citations omitted)).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 eliminated the summary-plenary distinc-
tion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprthed
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5804. See Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858, 2868 (1982) (bankruptcy court may
determine debtor's claims against third parties in context of bankruptcy
proceedings).
23. 711 F.2d at 517. Because Trailer Train was incorporated in Delaware, the
Third Circuit held that the case was governed by Delaware law. Id.
24. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER Busi-
NESS ENTERPRISES 562-64 (3d ed. 1983). The board's functions usually include pol-
icy decisions, selection of officers and other executive personnel, fixing of executive
compensation, delegation of authority, amendment, adoption and repeal of bylaws,
determination and declaration of dividends and other financial matters, and overall
supervision. Id at 564. Management is usually vested in the board by statute. Id. at
563. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983). The board has traditionally
been required to act in a duly convened meeting, on the theory that "consultation,
deliberation, and collective judgment" create the optimal climate for policy decision-
making. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra, at 565.
25. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 625.
Cases involving fiduciary duties can traditionally be classified into those
involving (a) competing with the corporation, (b) usurpation of corporate
opportunity, (c) having some interest which conflicts with the interest of the
corporation, (d) insider trading, (e) oppression of minority shareholders,
and () purchase of sale or control, but such situations do not exhaust the
possible corporate applications of fiduciary concepts.
Id. at 625.
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 13
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/13
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
duty to exercise due care in performing their corporate duties.2 6 If the direc-
tors observe these duties,2 7 they are immune from liability for decisions of
the board under the business judgment rule28 if the decision is attributable
Delaware has adopted the principle that directors are fiduciaries. See Lofland v.
Cahall, 13 Del. Ch. 384, 118 A. 1 (Del. 1922) (directors found liable for unauthorized
issuance of stock to themselves). As fiduciaries, directors are required to act with "the
utmost good faith and fair dealing." Id. at 389, 118 A. at 3. There must be "no
conflict between duty and self interest" which would violate the director's duty.
Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (diversion of corpo-
rate opportunity by director breached his fiduciary duty). See Arsht, The Business
Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 115 (1979) ("where a director .. .
stands to benefit personally from the decision as a director . ..his or her business
judgment is likely to be affected by personal interest"). For other cases applying the
principle that directors owe a fiduciary duty to their corporation and its stockholders,
see Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby Co., 27 Del. Ch. 381, 38 A.2d 808 (Del. 1944), Yasik v.
Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1941). For a discussion of the
fiduciary duties of directors, see generally 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 858 (perm. ed. 1965); Miller, The Fducao, Duties of a
Corporate Director, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 259 (1975) (discussion of duty of directors and
situations in which it can arise).
26. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 621. Directors are liable for
negligence in acting or failing to act. Id See, e.g., Hun v. Carey, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880)
(expenditure for new bank building held to be reckless and unreasonable due to fi-
nancial condition of bank). Once lack of due diligence is established, the business
judgment rule defense no longer applies. For a discussion of the business judgment
rule, see notes 27-32 and accompanying text infra. See, e.g., Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43
Dtl. Ch. 148, 157-58, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966) (gross abuse of discretion
precludes business judgment rule defense); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1944) (reasonable diligence on the part of directors is
required to apply the business judgment rule). See also Note, The Court's Independent
Busiess Judgment Will Be Apphed to a Decision of a Committee of Disinterested Directors to
Dismiss a Derivative Suit Alleging a Breach of Fducia y Duty By a Majority of the Corora-
tion's Directors, 27 VIL. L. REV. 1308, 1311 (1982).
27. H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 612.
28. Id. Henn explains the business judgment rule as follows:
Corporate management is vested in the board of directors. If in the
course of management, directors arrive at a decision, within the corpora-
tion's power (intra vires) and their authority for which there is a reasonable
basis, and they act in good faith, as the result of their independent discre-
tion and j,.idgment, and uninfluenced by any consideration other than what
they honestly believe to be the best interests of the corporation, a court will
not interfere with internal management and substitute its judgment for that
of the directors to enjoin or set aside the transaction or to surcharge the
directors for any resulting loss.
Id. at 661 (footnotes omitted).
Delaware courts have adopted the business judgment rule and will not upset
management decisions unless there is a strong showing of impropriety in the decision-
making process. See Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157, 221 A.2d 487, 492
(Del. 1966) (only a showing of "bad faith" or "gross abuse of discretion" takes a case
outside the business judgment rule); Merchantile Trading Co. v. Rosenbaum Grain
Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 325, 333-34, 154 A. 457, 461 (Del. Ch. 1931) (courts will not
interfere with corporate policy and business management unless "fraud, actual or
presumed, or illegal or ultra vires misconduct" is shown).
The rationale behind the business judgment rule is "to encourage qualified per-
sons to serve as directors by protecting them from liability for mere mistakes ofjudg-
[Vol. 28: p. 932
7
Lepore: Corporations - Under Delaware Law, Majority Shareholders Have No
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
to "any rational business purpose." 29
One aspect of the directors' fiduciary duty is the obligation to exercise
unbiased judgment on behalf of the corporation as a whole, without favoring
one group of shareholders over another.3 0 Once the plaintiff shows a breach
of this duty of impartiality in a decision of the board, the directors are no
longer shielded from liability by the business judgment rule.3 1
Preferential treatment by the board of directors may be traceable to a
majority shareholder or to a group which has control of the board.32 While
majority shareholders may ordinarily vote their shares and set corporate pol-
icy,3 3 they owe a fiduciary duty of fairness to the minority.3 4 When control-
ment when they have acted as prudent persons would have in the same situation."
Note, supra note 26, at 1312 n.16.
For a general discussion of the business judgment rule, see Lewis, The Business
Judgment Rule and Corporate Directors' Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REV.
157 (1978).
29. Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). See also Bodell v.
General Gas and Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420, 426, 140 A. 264, 267 (Del. 1927)
(honest mistake in setting price of unissued stock not reviewable).
30. H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 651. Any attempt by a director
to favor one corporate group over another breaches the duties owed the corporation
by the director. Id.
31. See Arshst, supra note 25, at 116. When an action is brought to challenge the
actions of a director, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the defendant-
director breached his fiduciary duty. See id. Once a breach of the duty of loyalty has
been shown, the director bears the burden of showing the intrinsic fairness of the
transaction. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979-80 (Del. 1977)
(equity court can scrutinize decision where there is an allegation of a breach of the
fiduciary duty owed minority stockholders); Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del.
1976) (court can scrutinize an interested director transaction, even if ratified by
shareholders, to determine its fairness); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d
382, 386 (Del. Ch. 1979) (even where the majority has a bona fide business purpose
for its action, it must show "entire fairness" to minority).
32. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123 (Del. Ch. 1971) (a ma-
jority shareholder or a dominant group may be able to effect "a direction of corpo-
rate conduct in such a way as to comport with the wishes or interests of the
corporation (or persons) doing the controlling").
33. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del.
Ch. 610, 622, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (Del. 1947). In Ringhng Bros., the court refused to find
that an agreement between two shareholders to act jointly in voting their shares and
to submit to arbitration in the event of a disagreement was unfair. Id. at 612-20, 53
A.2d at 442-46. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that "[g]enerally speak-
ing, a shareholder may exercise wide liberality of judgment in the matter of voting,
and it is not objectionable that his motives may be for personal profit, or determined
by whim, or caprice, so long as he violates no duty owed his fellow shareholders." Id.
at 622, 53 A.2d at 447 (citing Heil v. Standard G&E Co., 17 Del. Ch. 214, 151 A. 303
(Del. Ch. 1930)). Furthermore, if there is no impropriety, "[a] group of shareholders
may . . . vote their respective shares so as to obtain advantages of concerted action."
29 Del. Ch. at 622, 53 A.2d at 447.
34. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (corporate powers are held in
trust); Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel and Tube Co. of Am., 14 Del. Ch. 1, 11,
120 A. 486, 491 (Del. Ch. 1923). In Allied, the court noted that while the majority
could "practically desert the corporate venture by selling out its assets, and thereby
. . . deprive their associates of the opportunity to reap gains in the future," this right
1983-841
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ling shareholders use their domination over the corporation 35 to engage in
self-dealing, the resulting actions of the board are subject to careful scrutiny
by the courts for intrinsic fairness. 36 The "ihitrinsic fairness test" places the
burden on the controlling shareholders to demonstrate the total fairness of
their actions to minority shareholders.
37
can only "be exercised . . . upon terms and conditions that are fair to the corpora-
tion." Id.
The duties owed by controlling shareholders have been based on two theories:
(1) a direct approach-fiduciary duty is owed because of the position of superiority
and influence over the minority's interests held by the majority; (2) an indirect ap-
proach-because controlling shareholders dominate the corporation through influ-
ence over the board, their duties are analogous to those of the board. H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 654.
In a close corporation, shareholders may be held to a tricter standard of loyalty,
analogous to those duties owed by partners to one another. Id. at 655.
35. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 654. Domination of the
corporation can occur directly through independent shareholder action such as elec-
tions, or indirectly through control over the board in a particular decision. Id. See
Southern Pac. Ry. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919) (controlling shareholders owe duty
directly to minority where exercising direct action on behalf of themselves); Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 46 (3d Cir. 1947) (controlling shareholder had such
control over board of corporation that court characterized actions of board in re-
deeming stock as those of the "puppet" and the actions of the majority shareholder as
those of puppeteer).
36. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719-20 (Del. 1971). The plaintiff
in Sinclair complained about the payment of dividends by Sinclair's controlled sub-
sidiary (Sinven), the Sinven board's denial of industrial development, and the failure
of Sinven's board to enforce a contract between Sinclair and Sinven. Id. at 719. The
plaintiff contended that Sinclair was responsible for these actions, because it was a
majority shareholder who had dominated Sinven's board. Id. Furthermore, the
plaintiff contended that such actions benefitted Sinclair to the exclusion of Sinven's
minority shareholders. Id.
The court in Sinclair held that if the parent corporation had received a benefit to
exclusion of Sinven's minority shareholders, Sinclair's actions would be subject to
scrutiny to determine its fairness. Id. at 719-20. However, the court held that Sin-
clair had not engaged in such self-dealing as to Sinven's payment of dividends be-
cause the minority had shared in the benefit of the dividends, and that therefore its
actions were protected by the business judgment rule. Id at 721-22. Also, the court
found that Sinven had not been denied development by Sinclair. Id.
However, as to Sinclair's breach of its contract with Sinven, the court held that
the failure of Sinven's board to enforce the contract had amounted to self-dealing by
Sinclair, because of Sinclair's domination of Sinven, and that Sinclair was liable be-
cause it had failed to demonstrate the intrinsic fairness of its action. Id See also
Warshaw v. Calhoun, 43 Del. Ch. 148, 157-58, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966)
(courts will review action only where impropriety shown); Sterling v. Mayflower Ho-
tel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del. 1952) (where directors'
action furthers their self-interest, courts will review with careful scrutiny to determine
fairness); Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188, 192 (Del. Ch. 1971) (where self-dealing
shown, courts will review decision); E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORA-
TION LAW 75-77 (1972); H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 459; Note, supra
note 26, at 1311. The personal interest of a director will not void a transaction in
Delaware if the interest is disclosed to the board, a board committee or the sharehold-
ers; or if the transaction is fair and authorized by the shareholders or the board. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1982).
37. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 109-
[Vol. 28: p. 932
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In order to invoke the intrinsic fairness test, the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware has held that there must be a showing of self-dealing, or that the major-
ity shareholders used their control to obtain some benefit for themselves to
the exclusion and detriment of the minority.38 In Schnell v. Chris Craft, Inc.,39
the court found self-dealing where the majority advanced the date of the
annual shareholders' meeting in order to frustrate a proxy contest. 40 In Petty
v. Penntech Papeis, Inc.,4 ' a showing of self-dealing was based on the selective
10 (Del. 1982) (interested party bears burden of showing entire fairness of the trans-
action). See also Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976) (interested directors
must show intrinsic fairness); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 386
(Del. Ch. 1979) (majority must show entire fairness to minority where there is self-
dealing).
38. Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720 (parent corporation/majority shareholder held not
to have engaged in self-dealing). The court stated: "This standard will be applied
only when the fiduciary duty is accompanied by self-dealing. . . . Self-dealing oc-
curs when the parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsid-
iary to act in such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to
the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary." Id.
See also Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643, 256
N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965) (undue advantage over minority required to invoke intrinsic
fairness test). The paradigm example of the application of the intrinsic fairness test
to majority shareholder action has been in the context of merger-buyouts. See Wein-
berger v. UOP Corp., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (merger-buyout; majority share-
holders owe duty to minority); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293,
93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952) (majority shareholders owe minority shareholders duty of
fairness in merger); David J. Green & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del.
Ch. 1968) (parent/majority shareholder owes duty to minority shareholders of sub-
sidiary when merging with subsidiary); see also Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.,
43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (Del. 1967) (majority caused issuance of new stock to
perpetuate control; duty held to be violated); Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347
A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975) (majority caused selective redemptions of stock to perpetu-
ate control; held to violate fiduciary duty); Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 34
Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Del. Ch. 1953) (majority shareholder caused increases in
authorized shares and reduced par, effectively eliminating preemptive rights of mi-
nority shareholders, thereby breaching duty to minority). For a discussion of the
general duties of majority shareholders, see Lynch, A Concern for the Interest of Minority
Shareholders Under Modem Corporate Law, 3 J. CORP. L. 19 (1977) (emphasis on merger
situation).
In order to invoke the intrinsic fairness test against a director, the same showing
of self-dealing must be made. See notes 25, 28 & 31 and accompanying text supra.
39. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
40. Id. at 439. The court held that management had "attempted to use the
corporate machinery and the Delaware Law for the purpose of perpetuating itself in
office . . . and . . . for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of dissident
stockholders in the exercise of their rights . . . ." Id at 439. Therefore, the court
held that the amendment of the bylaws to advance the date of the stockholders'
meeting "may not be permitted to stand." Id Cf Condec Corp. v. Lukenheimer, 43
Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967) (breach of fiduciary duty by directors
where authorized but unissued stock was issued for the purpose of preventing plain-
tiff from obtaining control). But cf. American Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp.,
37 Del. Ch. 10, 135 A.2d 725 (Del. Ch.), aftd, 37 Del. Ch. 59, 136 A.2d 690 (Del.
1957) (not unlawful for directors to refuse to adjourn stockholders meeting to prevent
proxy contest or for directors to prevent extension of period for proxy contest).
41. 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975).
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redemption of preferred stock to perpetuate majority control.4 2 The major-
ity shareholders in Penniech were found to have breached their fiduciary duty
by unfairly depriving the minority of a benefit which they conferred upon
themselves.
43
Conversely, corporate management is under no duty to change corpo-
rate policy to accommodate minority shareholders whose disadvantage is not
attributable to self-dealing by the board or the controlling shareholders. 44
In Getty Oil Co. v. Skel4 Oil Co., 45 the Supreme Court of Delaware refused to
find self-dealing or to invoke the intrinsic fairness test where a third party set
the terms of a transaction which had a discriminatory impact on minority
shareholders. 46 In such a situation, the court held, the majority's fiduciary
duty to the minority does not require "self-sacrifice." '4 7
42. Id. at 143-44. The plaintiffs in Petty held preferred stock (stock entitled to a
dividend preference and/or a preference in the distribution of assets upon liquida-
tion) which was redeemable at the option of the corporation. Id at 141. As a class,
the preferred stockholders were entitled to elect a majority of the board of directors.
Id. Two of the preferred shareholders were also members of the board. Id In order
to allow the two directors who held shares of the preferred stock to have enough
voting power to keep the present board in office indefinitely, the board attempted to
exercise the corporation's redemption power over all the preferred stock, except those
shares held by the board members. Id This would leave the power to elect a major-
ity of the board in the hands of the present board members who had preferred stock.
Id. The court held this selective redemption of shares to be self-dealing. Id at 143-44.
43. Id at 143-44. See also Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (Del.
1962) (resolution of board ratifying chairman's unauthorized purchase of outstand-
ing stock in order to perpetuate control unlawful); Macht v. Merchants Mortgage &
Credit Co., 22 Del. Ch. 70, 194 A. 23 (Del. 1937) (sale of assets which would vest
voting power in preferred stock void without consent of preferred stockholders);
Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (Del. Ch. 1941) (issuance of shares for
purpose of maintaining control is a breach of duty).
44. See Sinclair Oil v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (self-dealing re-
quired before intrinsic fairness test applied). For a discussion of Sinclair, see notes 36
& 38 supra. See also Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970) (where
third party affects the distribution of benefits among shareholders, no self-dealing is
present); Trans World Airlines v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1977) (business
judgment rule applied where terms set by third party). For a discussion of Getty and
TWA, see notes 45-47 and accompanying text infra.
45. 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970).
46. Id. at 887-88. Getty was the majority shareholder (71%) in Skelly. Id at
884-85. Each company had received a separate oil import allocation under the
Mandatory Oil Import Program until the Government discontinued Skelly's alloca-
tion because of Getty's control of Skelly. Id at 885. Skelly unsuccessfully attempted
to force Getty to share its allocation. Id. at 885 (citing Skelly Oil Co. v. Udall, 288 F.
Supp. 109 (D.D.C. 1968)). Getty brought a declaratory judgment action on the issue
of whether it had breached a duty to Skelly. Id at 886. The Delaware Supreme
Court found that Getty had not breached any duty to Skelly because the govern-
ment, rather than Getty, set the terms of the transaction, and therefore there was no
self-dealing on Getty's part. Id. at 888. Thus, the court would not interfere in the
business decision by Getty not to share its allotment with Skelly. Id. at 887-88.
47. Id at 888. Cf Trans World Airlines v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch.
1977). In TWA, the airline brought suit against its parent corporation, claiming that
certain aircraft lease and purchase agreements made by the parent had disadvan-
taged TWA's minority shareholders, while providing the parent with tax advantages.
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Delaware courts view the sale of stock as the creation of a contract be-
tween the corporation and the shareholder, with the contract terms set forth
in the articles of incorporation, the corporation bylaws, and the incorpora-
tion statute.48 In addition, corporate policies to which the shareholder gives
his express or implied consent may be included in the terms of the con-
tract.49 In Coleman v. Taub,50 the Third Circuit, applying Delaware law, held
Id. at 5-9. The court refused to find self-dealing because of the immunity granted
persons whose transactions had been specifically approved by the Civil Aeronautics
Board. Id at 10-23 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1976)). Since the transactions com-
plained of had been approved by the CAB, the TWA court stated that to hold
Summa Corp. liable for these transactions "would be... to veto conduct specifically
authorized by an agency of competent jurisdiction"; further, to find that they were
not intrinsically fair "would directly repudiate the [CAB's] determination that they
were 'just and reasonable and in the public interest.' " Id. at 11-12. In reaching this
conclusion, the court favorably cited Geqy, stating that the business judgment rule is
ordinarily applied where a third party, such as a government, sets the terms of the
transaction. Id. at 9 (citing Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del.
1970)).
48. Peters v. United States Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 114 A. 598 (Del. Ch.
1921). The plaintiff in Peters was attempting to block a charter change which would
eliminate a distribution of a portion of surplus to preferred stockholders and change
the surplus distribution to common stockholders from a preferred to a discretionary
amount. Id. at 13-14, 114 A. at 599-600. The court noted that a corporation enters
into a contractual relationship with its shareholders when they purchase stock, and
that the relationship is especially applicable to the payment of dividends. Id. at 14,
114 A. at 600. The court recognized that the charter (the "contract") could be
amended by the proper procedure. Id. at 14-22, 114 A. at 600-04. Since this proce-
dure was complied with, the court refused to block the change. Id.
For other cases discussing the contractual nature of the corporate/shareholder
relationship, see Weinberg v. Baltimore Brick Co., 35 Del. Ch. 144, 114 A.2d 812
(Del. 1955) (control of corporation by preferred shareholders not unfair where agreed
to in consideration of preferred shareholders' giving up some of their rights as credi-
tors); Ellingwood v. Wolf's Head Oil Refining Co., 27 Del. Ch. 356, 38 A.2d 743 (Del.
1944) (rights of stockholders are contract rights and must be determined from char-
ter, which is interpreted as contracts are generally); Shanghai Power Co. v. Delaware
Trust Co., 316 A.2d 589 (Del. Ch. 1974) (rights of preferred stockholders are contract
rights governed by charter provisions, and method of interpretation is that of inter-
preting written contracts generally). Cf DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (1982).
49. Schrieber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 519 (Del. Ch. 1978) (terms of contract
between shareholder and corporation include corporate policies which were adopted
before the shareholder purchased his shares). An important factor in determining the
terms of a contract between the corporation and its shareholders as to a corporate
policy is whether a shareholder purchased with full knowledge of the policy. Good-
man v. Futrovsky, 42 Del. Ch. 468, 473-74, 213 A.2d 899, 902-03 (Del. 1965)
(purchase from wholesaler who was a large stockholder not unlawful where purchas-
ers of stock were notified of policy in prospectus), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). If
there is express approval of the corporate policy, this may also be evidence of a bind-
ing agreement. Elster v. American Airlines, 34 Del. Ch. 94, 97-.98, 100 A.2d 219, 221
(Del. Ch. 1953). Receipt of the benefits of a corporate policy is also a factor. Frank
v. Wilson & Co., 27 Del. Ch. 292, 304-05, 32 A.2d 277, 282-83 (Del. 1943) (accept-
ance by preferred stockholder of benefits of recapitalization estops him from ob-
jecting to it). Like any contract, these agreements are presumed valid absent fraud,
misrepresentation or overreaching. See Esso Standard Oil v. Cunningham, 35 Del.
Ch. 210, 114 A.2d 380 (Del. Ch. 1963), afl'd, 35 Del. Ch. 371, 118 A.2d 611 (Del.
1965) (misrepresentation or overreaching can prevent enforcement of a contract). See
1983-84]
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that a minority shareholder could bargain away those rights which otherwise
would be the basis for a fiduciary duty on the part of the majority. 5 1
Absent any contractual provision to the contrary, corporate manage-
ment has a duty to enable all shareholders to participate pro ra/a in the re-
turns of corporate enterprise.5 2 However, it is well-settled that shareholders
may agree to have the corporation distribute benefits unequally among its
shareholders. 53 In Wabash Ra/lway v. American Refrigerator Transport Co.,5 4 the
also Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 29 Del. Ch. 305, 313, 49
A.2d 612, 616 (Del. Ch. 1946) (plaintiff cannot seek approval of contract in part and
rescission in part, "as self interest may dictate"); 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 25,
§ 5737 (rev. perm. ed. 1980) (shareholder contracts with corporation are valid unless
contrary to public policy, fraudulent, conflict of interest, or prohibited by statute).
Once there has been valid assent to a corporate policy, the assenting shareholder
is estopped to object. See 11 W. FLETCHER, supra note 25, § 5352 (rev. perm. ed.
1971). See also Allied Supermarkets v. Grocers Dairy Co., 391 Mich. 727, 735-37, 29
N.W.2d 55, 58-60 (1982) (shareholder who knew of, bargained for, assented to, and
profited from corporate policy cannot successfully argue that it is improper). For a
discussion of Allhed, see notes 56-57 and accompanying text lnfra. Cf DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1982) (self-interest by directors will not alone void a transaction
where disclosed to and ratified or authorized by shareholders).
50. 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981).
51. Id. at 636. In Coleman, a minority shareholder/ex-employee argued that a
freeze-out merger which complied with statutory provisions but terminated his right
to corporate participation (i.e. dividends) violated the fiduciary duty owed to him by
the majority. d. at 629-31. While recognizing that Delaware courts have held that
minority shareholders have, "[alpart from the monetary value that can be placed
• . . on corporate stock, . . . additional interests in their shares," the court stated
that this "right of participation" may be terminated by the majority "when it serves
the corporate good." d. at 634-35 (citing Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969
(Del. 1977); Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979)). The court held
that Coleman could not argue that the freeze-out was not in the corporate good, as
Coleman's contract of employment had authorized the corporation to terminate his
shareholder status upon the termination of his employment:
Coleman bargained for the right to be a shareholder only while he re-
mained an employee . . . . We believe that a minority shareholder may
bargain away the "additional interest" in corporate participation which
might otherwise be the basis for a fiduciary duty on the part of the
majority.
Id at 636-37. For other examples of a shareholder altering a fiduciary duty owed to
him by contract, see note 53 and accompanying text nhfra.
52. Southern Pac. Ry. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1919) (it is a "wrong" for
majority not to share "fruits" by distributing them pro rala with minority). In Bogert,
Southern Pacific dominated the board of the Houston and Texas Central Railway
Company through indirect ownership of a majority of its stock. Id. at 486. Through
a reorganization, all of the Houston Company's mortgages were foreclosed and trans-
ferred to a new company. Id. In this process, Southern Pacific obtained all of the
stock and railroad lines of the new Houston Company, while the minority received
nothing. Id. The United States Supreme Court held that such action was a violation
of the duty of the majority to share pro rata in participation in corporate activity, and
that none of several defenses asserted by the majority was applicable. Id. at 488-98.
53. Wabash Ry. v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir.
1925) (agreement to distribute dividends in form of rebates on purchases from the
corporation, in proportion to purchases and not stock ownership, held valid); John-
son v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 1, 4 (E.D. Va. 1969) (under Virginia law, share-
holders may agree to non-pro rata dividend distribution); Speier v. United States, 9 F.
[Vol. 28: p. 932
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Eighth Circuit enforced a shareholder agreement among rail carriers to use
corporate assets to operate a refrigerator car company for their joint benefit
and to distribute excess profits as rebates in proportion to each shareholder's
use of the cars.
55
Similarly, in Alied Supermarkets v. Grocers Dat'g Co.,56 the Michigan
Supreme Court held that where the bylaws provided for dividends in the
form of rebates on purchases from the corporation, a minority shareholder
was not entitled to conventional dividends or stock redemption, even though
it was no longer making purchases from the corporation. 57 In an analogous
context, the Supreme Court of Delaware has held that a minority share-
holder cannot force the partial liquidation of the corporation for its benefit if
the corporation is merely acting in the manner for which it was organized,
where the corporation's policies were known to the shareholder and were
part of the contract with the corporation.
58
Supp. 1020, 1023 (Ct. Cl. 1935) (where parties agree, corporation can pay dividends
without regard to proportions of ownership); Little v. Caswell-Doyle-Jones, 305 So.
2d 842, 844-45 (Fla. App. 1975) (preferential distribution of corporate profits permis-
sible where there is unanimous agreement); Breslin v. Fries-Breslin Co., 70 N.J.L.
274, 58 A. 313 (N.J. App. 1904) (by unanimous consent, shareholders may adopt a
non-pro rala division of dividends); 14 W. FLETCHER, supra note 25, § 5352 (rev. perm.
ed. 1971). The articles of incorporation may classify stock as common and preferred.
12 W. FLETCHER, supra note 25, § 5443 (rev. perm. ed. 1970). In this event, holders
of preferred stock may also be entitled to dividend preference over common stock-
holders. See id. §§ 5443-5451 (rev. perm. ed. 1970) and authorities cited therein.
54. 7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1925).
55. Id. at 345-46.
56. 391 Mich. 729, 219 N.W.2d 55 (1974).
57. 1d. at 736-37, 219 N.W.2d at 59-60. In A/1ed, a supermarket shareholder
purchased stock from the dairy cooperative, and was entitled under the corporation's
articles to rebates on its purchases of dairy products from the cooperative as its sole
dividend. Id at 731-32, 219 N.W.2d at 57-58. Once it ceased to purchase from the
cooperative, the supermarket argued that such a dividend distribution scheme was
impermissible, and asked for relief in the form of either a distribution of dividends or
a forced repurchase of its stock. Id. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the
dividend distribution scheme was valid because the shareholder had voluntarily and
knowingly agreed to it. Id. at 736-37, 219 N.W.2d at 59-60. For a discussion of A/lied,
see Herbrecht, Business Associations, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 255, 258-59 (1976).
See also Klein v. Greenstein, 24 N.J. Super. 348, 94 A.2d 497 (1953). In Klein, the
plaintiff-shareholders complained that they were being disadvantaged because the
corporation paid rebates to shareholders who were customers. Id at 350, 94 A.2d at
498. The plaintiffs, who were not customers, sought to share in these payments,
claiming that because they were dividends, the plaintiffs were entitled to a propor-
tionate share. Id The court dismissed the action because it did not think the refunds
were "dividends," and in so doing noted that "[nlot every benefit obtained by a
stockholder from his corporation is a dividend." Id. at 352, 94 A.2d at 499 (citation
omitted).
Cf Buechner v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 38 Del. Ch. 490, 154
A.2d 684 (Del. 1959) (assets of a going corporation belong to the corporation; there-
fore no individual shareholder may demand partial liquidation).
58. Berwald v. Mission Dev. Co., 40 Del. Ch, 509, 185 A.2d 480 (Del. 1962). In
Berwald, the Mission Company was a holding company incorporated for the purpose
of acquiring and holding substantial amounts of Tidewater Oil Company stock. Id.
at 510-11, 185 A.2d at 481. When Tidewater began declaring stock dividends in lieu
1983-841
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Against this background, the Third Circuit considered the Reading
trustees' claim that Trailer Train's board of directors, acting at the behest of
its majority shareholders, breached a fiduciary duty owed to Reading by
reaffirming corporate policies under which railroad equipment lease oppor-
tunities took the place of cash dividends, in view of the fact that Reading
had ceased its railroad operations.59 The Third Circuit acknowledged that
under Delaware law,60 directors6 1 and majority stockholders owe a fiduciary
duty to the corporation and to minority shareholders. 62 However, the court
explained that the parameters of the fiduciary duty owed depend upon the
circumstances of the challenged action or inaction. 63 Under the generally
applicable business judgment rule, the Third Circuit noted, Delaware courts
will not interfere with rational management decisions. 64 However, the court
of cash dividends in 1954 in order to conserve cash for improvements, Mission discon-
tinued its payment of dividends. Id. at 511, 185 A.2d at 481. The plaintiffs, who had
purchased their stock in 1956 and 1959, cl.allenged the defendant's policy of retain-
ing the Tidewater stock dividends. Id. at 512-13, 185 A.2d at 482. The court held:
The sole corporate purpose of Mission is and has been to hold Tidewater
stock. Any investor in its shares could readily ascertain this fact. Because of
this he knows, or should know, that he is buying for growth and not for
income.
However the various arguments are put they come to this: Plaintiffs
are in effect seeking to wind up the corporation, either wholly or partially,
because it is doing exactly what it was lawfully organized to do.
We think the plaintiffs have failed to make a case.
Id. at 514-15, 185 A.2d at 483.
Similarly, Third Circuit Chief Judge Seitz (in his previous role as Chancellor)
has stated that "a heavy burden is cast on anyone seeking in substance to have the
court liquidate [a going corporation]," and that the decision is to be based upon
whether the challenged policy existed prior to the minority shareholder's acquisition
of stock. Warshaw v. Calhoun, 42 Del. Ch. 437, 441, 213 A.2d 539, 541-42 (Del. Ch.
1965), affd, 43 Del. Ch. 48, 221 A.2d 487 (Del. 1966).
59. 711 F.2d at*517. Reading argued that Trailer Train's reaffirmation of its
original car leasing policv, refusal to pay dividends, and continued reinvestment of
earnings in new equipment breached a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders in
Reading's position who were no longer engaged in rail operations. Id.
60. Id. The court noted that Delaware law controlled its disposition of Read-
ing's claim, because Trailer Train was incorporated in that state. Id. (citing Thomas
v. Roblin Indus., 520 F.2d 1393, 1397 (3d Cir. 1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS §§ 306, 309 (1971)).
61. 711 F.2d at 517 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503,
510 (D-l. 1939) (corporate directors stand in a fiduciary relationship to their corpora-
tion and its stockholders)). For a discussion of the fiduciary duty of directors, see
notes 25-31 and accompanying text supra.
62. 711 F.2d at 517 (citing Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976-77 (Del.
1977) (majority shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and to minority
shareholders if they combine to dominate the board and control the corporation))
(further citations omitted). For a discussion of the fiduciary duty of majority share-
holders, see notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
63. 711 F.2d at 517 (citing Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Group, 444 A.2d 261, 265
(Del. Ch. 1982) (duty owed by majority depends upon nature of challenged action or
inaction)).
64. 711 F.2d at 577 (citing Sinclair Oil v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)
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continued, where the plaintiff can show that majority shareholders have ex-
ercised control over the board of directors to engage in self-dealing, Dela-
ware courts will judge the action of the dominated board under the
"intrinsic fairness" test.65
The Third Circuit then reviewed the district court's determination that
the majority shareholders of Trailer Train had engaged in self-dealing and
had maintained corporate policies which did not pass muster under the in-
trinsic fairness test.66 The Third Circuit assumed without deciding that a
majority shareholder group comprised of operating railroads controlled
Trailer Train's board of directors, but the court did not believe Reading had
shown that the majority had engaged in self-dealing. 6 7
In order for self-dealing to occur, the Third Circuit stated, the majority
shareholders must dominate corporate policy in such a way as to enable
themselves to receive something from the corporation to the exclusion and
detriment of the minority shareholders. 6a Although Reading argued that
only the majority benefitted from the use of the equipment, to Reading's
exclusion and detriment, the court noted that Reading retained the same
right of access to corporate equipment enjoyed by the majority.69 The Third
(courts will not interfere with honest business judgment); Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett
Group, 444 A.2d 261, 265-66 (business judgment rule applied); E. FOLK, supra note
36, at 75-77. For a discussion of the business judgment rule in the context of Dela-
ware law, see notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra.
65. 711 F.2d at 517-18 (citing Sinclair Oil v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719-20 (Del.
1971)) (further citations omitted). Under the intrinsic fairness test, the court ex-
plained, "those asserting the validity of the corporation's actions have 'the burden of
establishing its entire fairness to the minority stockholders, sufficient to "pass the test
of careful scrutiny by the courts."' " 711 F.2d at 518 (quoting Singer, 380 A.2d at
976) (further citations omitted). For a discussion of the intrinsic fairness test as devel-
oped and interpreted under Delaware law, see notes 34-47 and accompanying text
supra.
66. 711 F.2d at 518. Finding that the operating railroads of Trailer Train domi-
nated the corporation and used their control to perpetuate policies which benefitted
themselves but prevented Reading from getting any return on its stock, the district
court had concluded that self-dealing had occurred and that the management deci-
sion could not withstand intrinsic fairness scrutiny. Id. For a discussion of the district
court opinion in Reading, see notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
67. 711 F.2d at 519. Since the requisite element of self-dealing was not estab-
lished, the Third Circuit reviewed the decision of Trailer Train's board under the
business judgment rule, rather than the strict test of intrinsic fairness. Id. For a
discussion of the intrinsic fairness test and the business judgment rule, see notes 27-47
and accompanying text supra.
68. 711 F.2d at 518 (citing Standard Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720
(Del. 1971)).
69. 711 F.2d at 518. The Third Circuit quoted the district court's agreement
with Reading's argument:
By making use of Trailer Train equipment the sole benefit of stock owner-
ship, the board of directors has effectively permitted the company's user-
shareholders to obtain a benefit which is not available to non-users, Read-
ing and Erie Lackawanna.
Id. (quoting In re Reading, 551 F. Supp. 1205, 1217 (E.D. Pa. 1982)). For a discussion
of the district court opinion in Reading, see notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
The Third Circuit pointed out that Reading retained the right of access to the pool
1983-84]
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Circuit rejected Reading's contention that the majority shareholders' use of
the car pool was self-dealing. 70 Reasoning that the use of the cars "is not
extended free to all who buy stock" but must be purchased at Trailer Train's
rates, the Third Circuit pointed out that while Reading no longer had the
benefit of car use, neither did it have the car hire charges as a cost. 7 1 Unless
the benefit of equipment use was disproportionate to its cost, the court con-
tinued, "Reading [was not] disadvantaged nor the operating railroads ad-
vantaged by [Reading's] inability to use the cars."'72 Therefore, the Third
Circuit would not regard the operating railroads' continued use of the corpo-
rate car pool as self-dealing. 73
The Third Circuit then addressed Reading's second allegation of self-
dealing: that "the car hire rates, to the extent they were less than the ICC
per diem rates, constituted a 'constructive dividend,' " which was denied to
the minority non-users.7 4 The Third Circuit concluded that Reading could
not characterize the dividend distribution scheme as self-dealing, because
Reading had specifically agreed to the arrangement at the time it purchased
Trailer Train stock. 75 The court recognized that under Delaware law, the
fiduciary duty owed to a minority shareholder is subject to change by con-
cars and the right to a pro rala share of the assets on dissolution. 711 F.2d at 518 &
n.8. The court also noted that "the rights Reading seeks, e.g., redemption on demand
and compulsory dividends, are rights which no shareholder presently possesses." Id.
70. 711 F.2d at 518.
71. Id. For a discussion of Trailer Train's rate policy, see notes 5-9 and accom-
panying text supra.
72. 711 F.2d at 518 (citation omitted). Only in the event that the car hire rates
themselves were a reward of stock ownership, the court explained, would Reading
have been disadvantaged by its inability to use the cars. Id. (citing Sinclair Oil v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1971)). For a discussion of how Trailer Train's car
hire rates compared to the ICC per diem rates, see note 8 supra.
73. 711 F.2d at 518.
74. While the Third Circuit did not decide the question of whether the low car
hire rates constituted a constructive dividend to the extent that they were lower than
the ICC per diem rates, the court noted that the district court had found this theory
"less than compelling." Id. at 518 n.9. The district court had found that Trailer
Train had set its rates to cover its own costs, without reference to the ICC rates. Id.
Secondly, the district court had said that the low rates were not pro rata dividends
because " 'the return which each shareholder obtained was predicated [solely] upon
use of the company's equipment and not upon proportionate equity ownership.' " Id
(quoting In re Readng, 551 F. Supp. at 1219) (emphasis in original). See also Klein v.
Greenstein, 24 N.J. Super. 348, 352-53, 94 A.2d 497, 499 (1953) (not all benefits re-
ceived by shareholders are dividends). Finally, the Third Circuit remarked, "the re-
semblance to dividends is especially tenuous ...because Trailer Train's low prices
are extended even to non-shareholders in possession of Trailer Train cars." 711 F.2d
at 518-19 n.9 (citing In re Reading, 557 F. Supp. at 1217 n.5). For a discussion of
Trailer Train's rate policies, see notes 5-9 and accompanying text supra.
75. 711 F.2d at 519. The Third Circuit noted that Reading agreed to Trailer
Train's policies in signing the Form A Car Contract, which "explicitly stated that
Trailer Train would charge users of pool cars the lowest possible car hire rates, and
would not accumulate surplus earnings or profits from which pro rala dividends could
be paid." Id. (citation omitted).
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tractual agreement. 76 While ordinarily dividends must be distributed
among shareholders pro rala according to their ownership of stock, the court
explained that if shareholders unanimously consent to a different scheme,
they are bound by their agreement and may be estopped to object to a dis-
criminatory arrangement. 77 Therefore, the Third Circuit stated, "Whether
or not the car hire rates are constructive dividends, Reading is receiving ex-
actly the benefits from its Trailer Train stock for which it bargained."
'78
Finally, the Third Circuit stated that Reading's cessation of rail opera-
tions did not impose any different or additional fiduciary duty upon the op-
erating shareholders of Trailer Train. 79  The court held that the
76. Id. (citing Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 629, 636 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying
Delaware law) (rights of stockholders may be altered by binding agreements between
the stockholders and the corporation); Weinberg v. Baltimore Brick Co., 35 Del. Ch.
225, 241, 114 A.2d 812, 821 (Del. 1955) (control of corporation by preferred share-
holders not unfair where so contracted); Ellingwood v. Wolf's Head Oil Refining Co.,
27 Del. Ch. 356, 362-63, 38 A.2d 743, 747 (Del. 1944) (rights of stockholders are
contract rights which are determined from charter)) (further citation omitted).
77. 711 F.2d at 519 (citing 11 W. FLETCHER, supra note 25, § 5352 (rev. perm.
ed. 1971)) (further citations omitted). The Third Circuit stated that shareholders
may enter a valid and binding agreement to accept distributions in the form of re-
bates on purchases from the corporation. 711 F.2d at 519 (citing Wabash Ry. v.
American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F.2d 335, 345-46 (8th Cir. 1925)). Further, the
Third Circuit found authority for the proposition that even shareholders who are no
longer customers of the corporation are bound by such an agreement. 711 F.2d at
519 (citing Allied Supermarkets v. Grocers Dairy Co., 391 Mich. 729, 735-37, 219
N.W.2d 55, 58-60 (1974)). For a discussion of the effect of shareholders' agreements
to alternative dividend distribution schemes, see notes 53-57 and accompanying text
supra.
78. 711 F.2d at 519. The court stated that Reading could avoid the binding
effect of its contract with Trailer Train only by showing that it was obtained by
fraud, misrepresentation, or overreaching. Id. (citing Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Cun-
ningham, 35 Del. Ch. 210, 215, 114 A.2d 380, 383 (Del. Ch. 1953), affd, 35 Del. Ch.
371, 118 A.2d 611 (Del. 1955)). Even if Reading could make such a showing, it
would still have to prove that it did not ratify the agreement by accepting benefits
under it. 711 F.2d at 519 (citing Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Universal Oil
Prods., 29 Del. Ch. 305, 313, 49 A.2d 612, 616 (Del. Ch. 1946)) (further citation
omitted). The court felt that Reading would be hard-pressed to show that the agree-
ment was fraudulently obtained, since Trailer Train's policies were well-established
and Reading was fully aware of them when it purchased its stock. 711 F.2d at 519
(citing Goodman v. Futrovsky, 42 Del. Ch. 468, 473-74, 213 A.2d 899, 902-03 (Del.
1965) (purchase from stockholder/wholesaler not unlawful where it was disclosed to
prospective stockholders in prospectus), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966); Schreiber v.
Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 519 (Del. Ch. 1978) (awareness of corporate policies before
purchase prevents complaint that they are unfair)). Furthermore, the court sug-
gested that because Reading "enjoyed the fruits of those policies for fifteen years
without complaint ...and expressed its approval of those policies both before and
after it entered reorganization," it had probably ratified the agreement regardless of
how it had been obtained. 711 F.2d at 519 (citing Frank v. Wilson & Co., 27 Del. Ch.
292, 304-05, 32 A.2d 277, 282-83 (Del. 1943); Elster v. American Airlines, 34 Del. Ch.
94, 97-98, 100 A.2d 219, 221 (Del. Ch. 1953) (shareholder who votes in favor of a
corporate policy cannot later complain that it is unfair)). For a discussion of invali-
dation of fraudulently-obtained shareholder contracts and ratification, see note 49
supra.
79. 711 F.2d at 519-20. Reading argued that since it was permanently deprived
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corporation's failure to recognize Reading's changed circumstances did not
amount to self-dealing.8 0 Noting that the Delaware Supreme Court had
held the intrinsic fairness test particularly inapplicable where the terms of a
dispute between majority and minority shareholders are set by a third
party,8 1 the Third Circuit pointed out that Reading's present status was dic-
tated by the federal government.8 2 Because "self-sacrifice" is not part of the
majority shareholder's fiduciary duty in such cases,8 3 the court refused to
order the partial liquidation of the corporation " 'because it is doing exactly
what it was lawfully organized to do.' "84
Since Reading could not prove the self-dealing requisite to intrinsic fair-
ness scrutiny, the Third Circuit reviewed Trailer Train's actions under the
business judgment rule.8 5 The court found that the corporation's reaffirma-
tion of its lease policy, refusal to pay dividends, and continued reinvestment
of earnings in new equipment could each be attributed to a rational business
purpose.8 6 The court concluded that neither the directors nor the majority
shareholders had breached their fiduciary duty to Reading.
7
In examining the decision in Readtng, it is submitted that the Third Cir-
cuit reached an emminently logical conclusion in a rather unique situation,
given that under Delaware law the rights of a shareholder are subject to
variation by contract.88 While under normal circumstances Trailer Train
of the enjoyment of its right of access to the railroad cars by virtue of the conveyance
of its rail properties to Conrail, Trailer Train engaged in self-dealing by failing to
react to Reading's change of circumstances. Id. For a discussion of Reading's con-
veyance to Conrail under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act, see note 2 and ac-
companying text supra.
80. 711 F.2d at 519-20.
81. Id (citing Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970); Trans
World Airlines v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. Ch. 1977)). For a discussion of
Get/, and TW4, see notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra. For a general discus-
sion of the intrinsic fairness test, see notes 34-38 and accompanying text supra.
82. 711 F.2d at 520. For a discussion of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act,
see note 2 and accompanying text supra.
83. 711 F.2d at 520 (citing Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 888
(Del. 1970)) (further citation omitted).
84. Id. (quoting Berwald v. Mission Dev. Co., 40 Del. Ch. 509, 514-15, 185 A.2d
480, 483 (Del. 1962) (plaintiff who wishes to liquidate corporation for acting as law-
fully organized to act bears heavy burden)).
85. Id For a general discussion of the intrinsic fairness test and the business
judgment rule, see notes 27-38 and accompanying text supra.
86. 711 F.2d at 520. The court determined that Trailer Train's car leasing pol-
icy, which minimized rates, probably assured a high level of demand for the cars. Id.
It also determined that the refusal to pay dividends helped maintain the low rates
and, finally, that reinvestment of earnings assured that customer demands for equip-
ment could be met. Id.
87. Id.
88. See Peters v. United States Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 114 A. 598 (Del.
Ch. 1921) (stockholder enters into a contract with corporation when he purchases
stock). See also Weinberg v. Baltimore Brick Co., 35 Del. Ch. 225, 114 A.2d 812 (Del.
1955) (contract may alter rights); Ellingwood v. Wolf's Head Oil Refining Co., 27
Del. Ch. 356, 38 A.2d 743 (Del. 1944) (rights of shareholders are contract rights and
must be determined from charter, interpreted as any other contract). For a discus-
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would have had the duty to allow all shareholders to share pro rala in divi-
dends,89 Reading had agreed to a distribution scheme which allocated divi-
dends in the form of savings on leases from the corporation. 90 This
agreement effectively 9' altered the duty owed to Reading by Trailer Train
and its majority shareholders. 92
Reading could not complain that the contract itself was invalid, as
there was no evidence of misrepresentation or overreaching.93 Reading had
purchased its stock with full knowledge of Trailer Train's policies and had
accepted the benefits of those policies without complaint. 94 It is submitted
that it would be manifestly unjust to allow Reading to complain fifteen years
later that Trailer Train's policies amounted to a breach of the fiduciary duty
owed to it by Trailer Train's directors and majority shareholders.95
Furthermore, any harm resulting to Reading arose as a result of its de-
parture from the railroad business and its refusal to dispose of its Trailer
sion of the contractual nature of shareholder rights under Delaware law, see notes 48-
49 and accompanying text supra.
The Third Circuit has previously recognized the contractual nature of share-
holder rights. See Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981).
89. See Southern Pac. Ry. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 492 (1919). For a discussion
of Bogert, see note 52 and accompanying text supra.
90. For a discussion of the formal agreement entered into by Reading, see notes
6 & 9 and accompanying text supra. Even if Reading had not signed the formal
contract, it would have been bound by the terms of Trailer Train's policies of which
it had notice and by Trailer Train's charter. See Goodman v. Futrovsky, 42 Del. Ch.
468, 473-74, 213 A.2d 899, 902-03 (Del. 1965), cert. den'ed, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (knowl-
edge of corporate policy prior to stock purchase alters duty); Schreiber v. Bryan, 396
A.2d 572, 519 (Del. Ch. 1978) (contract between shareholder and corporation evi-
denced by knowledge of corporate policies prior to stock purchase); Peters v. United
States Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 14, 114 A. 598, 600 (Del. Ch. 1921) (contract
between shareholders and corporation found in charter). For a discussion of these
principles, see notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
91. See Wabash v. American Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1925)
(agreement to distribute dividends, in the form of rebates on purchase from corpora-
tion, is valid); Little v. Caswell-Doyle-Jones, 305 So. 2d 842, 844-45 (Fla. App. 1975)
(unanimous agreement for non-pro rala dividend distribution upheld). For a discus-
sion of the propriety of a unanimous agreement to distribute dividends on a non-pro
rata basis, see notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra.
92. See Coleman v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying Delaware law)
(fiduciary duty owed to stockholder may be modified by contract). For a discussion
of Coleman and other Delaware cases holding that the rights of stockholders are con-
tractual, see notes 48-51 and accompanying text supra.
93. See Esso Standard Oil v. Cunningham, 35 Del. Ch. 210, 114 A.2d 380 (Del.
Ch. 1963), qft'd, 35 Del. Ch. 371, 118 A.2d 611 (Del. 1965) (misrepresentation or
overreaching can invalidate a contract).
94. 711 F.2d at 512, 519.
95. Under Delaware law, knowledge of corporate policy and receipt of its bene-
fits will estop a shareholder from objecting to the policy. Frank v. Wilson & Co., 27
Del. Ch. 292, 304-05, 32 A.2d 277, 282-83 (Del. 1943). It is submitted that another
factor supporting estoppel is the equal bargaining power of Reading and Trailer
Train. For a discussion of the fiduciary duties of directors and majority stockholders,
see notes 25-38 and accompanying text supra.
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Train stock.9 6 Trailer Train undertook its policies of minimization of rates,
refusal to pay dividends, and reinvestment of earnings in good faith and in
accordance with the contract with its shareholders, including Reading.
9 7
There was no element of self-dealing on the part of majority shareholders, as
Trailer Train was incorporated for the sole purpose of providing a pool of
rail cars to its shareholders. 98 Reading agreed to this explicitly by virtue of
its purchase of stock with knowledge of these policies. 9 9 The district court
was incorrect in holding that Trailer Train's actions were self-dealing and
intrinsically unfair."0° The district court completely ignored the fact that
Reading had agreed to have Trailer Train operate as it did. 0 1 It is submit-
ted that the district court's failure to consider the contract law issue was
questionable; since the court had found as a fact that a contract had been
created, at least a consideration of its impact on Reading's rights as a share-
holder was required.
0 2
The Third Circuit's granting of the relief requested by Reading would
have been tantamount to holding that a shareholder can compel the partial
liquidation of a corporation even though the corporation is "doing exactly
96. See 711 F.2d at 514. Reading did not convey the stock to Conrail when it
left the railroad business; its trustees requested that the stock not be transferred be-
cause they regarded it as a "valuable asset." Id. Furthermore, Reading turned down
a $1,500,000 offer by Trailer Train to repurchase the stock. Id. at 514 n. 14. Trailer
Train agreed to keep the offer open, regardless of the outcome of this litigation. Id.
It is submitted that Trailer Train's offer, though much less than the stipulated
$9,830,707 book value of the stock, was still generous because there was no market for
this unique stock and, at any rate, Trailer Train was not obligated to repurchase it.
97. 711 F.2d at 513. For a discussion of the formal contract entered into by
Reading and Trailer Train, see notes 6 & 9 and accompanying text supra. Even with-
out this formal contract, Reading would have been bound by these policies, as it
purchased its stock with knowledge of them and received the benefits of them. For a
discussion of the principle that such express or implied consent to corporate policies
gives rise to a contract as between a shareholder and the corporation, see note 49
supra.
98. Ste 711 F.2d at 512.
99. 711 F.2d at 513. For a discussion of the implied contract between a share-
holder and the corporation, see notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
100. 551 F. Supp. at 1220. For a discussion of self-dealing and the intrinsic
fairness test, see notes 35-43 and accompanying text supra.
101. See 551 F. Supp. at 1214-20. The district court did not even consider the
fact that Delaware law recognizes an implied contract between shareholders and the
corporation as to 1) matters in the charter; 2) policies which the shareholder had
knowledge of before his stock purchase; and 3) policies that provided benefits which
the shareholder accepted. For a discussion of these principles of Delaware law, see
notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
102. It is submitted that even under the intrinsic fairness test, the district court
should have found that Trailer Train was completely fair to Reading, because Read-
ing had contractually altered the duty owed to it as a shareholder. See Coleman v.
Taub, 638 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying Delaware law). For a discussion of
Coleman, see notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra. Thus, even if the Third Cir-
cuit had regarded the majority shareholders of Trailer Train as engaging in self-
dealing, the contract would still have compelled a ruling in favor of Trailer Train.
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what it was lawfully organized to do."' 10 3 A minority shareholder's changed
circumstances, over which the corporation had no control, should not give
the shareholder any greater rights vis-a-vis the corporation. 104 It is submit-
ted that the Third Circuit properly refused to hold that Reading's changed
circumstances warranted the creation of any greater duty on the part of
Trailer Train.105
It is submitted that while situations precisely analogous to the Reading
situation may be uncommon, the broader impact of the decision lies in the
Third Circuit's clear signal that agreements between minority stockholders
and their corporations will be honored. Since valid agreements between
stockholders and a corporation need not be based on a formal contract,'
°6
Readng is a warning to shareholders to be aware of the policies of a corpora-
tion before investing. The Third Circuit, at least, will not rush to the aid of
minority shareholders if a change in circumstances should eliminate the ben-
efits of their stock ownership.1
0 7
Cregory F Lepore
103. Berwald v. Mission Co., 40 Del. Ch. 509, 512, 185 A.2d 480, 483 (Del.
1962). For a discussion of Berwald, see note 58 and accompanying text supra.
104. Delaware courts have found the intrinsic fairness test "particularly inappli-
cable" where the action which disadvantaged the minority shareholders had its basis
in action by a party other than the board or the majority shareholders. Getty Oil Co.
v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970); Trans World Airlines v. Summa Corp.,
374 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1977) (decision of board judged under business judgment rule
where terms are set by third party).
105. See Getty, 267 A.2d at 888. In the words of Supreme Court of Delaware,
the majority's fiduciary duty to the minority does not require "self-sacrifice." Id.
106. For a discussion of factors which lead to an implied contract between a
shareholder and a corporation, see notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra.
107. The Third Circuit's decision is consistent with the decisions of the few
courts which have had occasion to consider similar questions. See, e.g., Allied Super-
markets v. Grocers Dairy Co., 391 Mich. 769, 219 N.W.2d 55 (1974) (agreement to
distribute dividends as rebates on purchases from the corporation binding even on
non-customer shareholders); Klein v. Greenstein, 24 N.J. Super. 348, 94 A.2d 497
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